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How will recent Supreme Court decisions on
personal jurisdiction impact the legacy of
International Shoe and the future of complex litigation?
by DAVID W. ICHEL

I

n just a few years, the
Supreme Court has meaningfully altered the landscape
for establishing personal jurisdiction
over corporations. Its quartet of unanimous and nearly unanimous decisions
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown,1 Daimler AG v. Bauman,2
BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,3 and
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court of California4 substantially recalibrated the Fourteenth Amendment
due process analysis for corporate
personal jurisdiction established more
than 80 years ago in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.5 Its more
divided 4-2-3 decision in J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro6 during
the same period has heightened concern about the realities of establishing
jurisdiction over foreign companies
in an increasingly global marketplace.
These developments impact both state
and corresponding federal district
courts: Pursuant to Federal Rule 4(k)
(1)(A) and long-standing federal precedent, federal courts ordinarily follow

state law in determining the bounds of
their jurisdiction for diversity, alienage, and even federal question matters
for which Congress has not specifically
provided for nationwide jurisdiction.
This article, which summarizes a
much more extensive analysis published in the Rutgers Law Review,7
examines these decisions’ potential
impact on class actions and other complex litigation and provides specific
recommendations to protect plaintiffs’
access to a reasonable forum that is
also fair to the defendants.

GIVING INTERNATIONAL SHOE
A SHINE — OR THE BOOT?
As every law student learned in firstyear Civil Procedure, International
Shoe introduced the minimum contacts-based, “fair play and substantial
justice” analysis for personal jurisdiction. International Shoe changed
the reigning analysis — from the
question of whether the state has
physical power over a defendant by

virtue of physical presence and service
of process, as articulated in Pennoyer
v. Neff,8 to whether the defendant’s
contacts with the state are of such
quality and quantity that it would be
fundamentally fair and reasonable to
subject the defendant to jurisdiction,
either for a specific claim or generally
for all claims.9
Addressing jurisdiction over a corporation, International Shoe established,
in substance, a continuum. At one end
were contacts clearly evincing the
proper assertion of jurisdiction —
such as a corporation maintaining its
“home” or “principal place of business”
in the state, or having “continuous corporate operations . . . so substantial and
of such a nature” as to allow jurisdiction over any lawsuit against it there
(what later came to be termed “general” jurisdiction). Further along the
continuum were lesser contacts that
still warranted jurisdiction — such as
“when the activities of the corporation
. . . have not only been continuous and
systematic, but also give rise to the u

Goodyear, Daimler, BNSF, and Bristol-Myers
[have] substantially recalibrated the
Fourteenth Amendment due process
analysis for corporate personal jurisdiction.
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liabilities sued on” and even some “single or occasional acts” in the state that
“because of their nature and quality
and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed to render the
corporation liable to suit” (what later
came to be termed “specific” jurisdiction). At the other end of the continuum
were contacts that were insufficient to
justify jurisdiction — such as those that
were too fleeting and unrelated to the
lawsuit to justify jurisdiction.10
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s
opinion in International Shoe confirmed that the analysis envisioned by
the Court was intended to be a flexible
one, based on the continuum of a corporation’s qualitative and quantitative
corporate contacts with a state:
It is evident that the criteria by
which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which
justify the subjection of a corporation to suit and those which do
not cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative. . . . Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather
upon the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure.11
International Shoe was followed by
the enactment of long-arm jurisdiction statutes in all states and led to
decades of litigation and commentary over how much “doing business”
in a state should be required for the
exercise of general, all-purpose jurisdiction and how much connection a
state must have to the plaintiff’s claims
in a lawsuit for the exercise of specific,
claim-related jurisdiction. In particular, the post-International Shoe courts
commonly allowed general jurisdiction over corporations based upon the
company doing “continuous and substantial business” in the state.12
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The Supreme Court’s quartet of decisions in Goodyear, Daimler, BNSF, and
Bristol-Myers, while reaffirming the
decision as “canonical,”13 substantially
recast the more flexible International
Shoe jurisdictional continuum into a
brighter-line, stricter dichotomy that
is both reflective of the post-International Shoe concepts of “general”
versus “specific” jurisdiction and
more protective against forum shopping. Under this new dichotomy, for
a corporation to be subject to general (all-purpose) jurisdiction, the
firm must be essentially “at home” in
the state, such as being incorporated
or having its principal place of business there.14 Otherwise, only specific
(claim-connected) jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible: Even if the
defendant does very substantial, continuous business in a state in which it
is not “at home,” each plaintiff’s claim
must “arise out of or relate to” the
company’s contacts with the state in
order to establish personal jurisdiction.15 The Court also emphasized in
the quartet of decisions that general

jurisdiction should be the exception
to the rule that, ordinarily, jurisdiction
should be specific, based on the company’s claim-connections to the state.16

Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF:
The “At Home” Requirement
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored
the Court’s 2011 unanimous decision
in Goodyear, holding that due process
would not permit North Carolina courts
to subject three European Goodyear
subsidiaries to general jurisdiction for
a vehicle accident that took place in
Europe. The case presented product
liability claims brought on behalf of
North Carolina citizens injured in an
accident in France involving a car with
Goodyear-brand tires manufactured
and distributed by the three European
subsidiaries. The North Carolina
courts had justified jurisdiction over
the subsidiaries based on their having
placed the tires in the global “stream
of commerce” — even though only
a tiny percentage of tires manufactured by these subsidiaries came to be
sold in North Carolina, the particular
tires at issue were not sold into North
Carolina, and the accident did not occur
there.17 Goodyear thus appeared to be
an easy case for the Court to overturn
the assertion of general jurisdiction
over the foreign subsidiaries.
Yet Justice Ginsburg’s opinion went
further to adopt a new due process
requirement that a company must
be essentially “at home” for a state
to assert general jurisdiction over it,
identifying the paradigm “home” as
the company’s place of incorporation
or principal place of business.18 The “at
home” requirement was groundbreaking because many courts had been
finding general jurisdiction based on a
company’s continuous and substantial
“doing business” in states that were
not the corporation’s “home.”19 Justice
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Ginsburg herself later called the decision “pathmarking.”20
Then, three years later in Daimler,21
the Court unanimously reversed a
Ninth Circuit ruling that a California
federal district court could exercise
general personal jurisdiction over the
German parent company, Daimler.
That suit asserted federal Alien Tort
Act and state law claims on behalf of
22 Argentine plaintiffs alleging that
Daimler’s Argentine subsidiary had
been complicit in numerous human
rights violations by the former
Argentine government.22
Although there obviously could not
be specific jurisdiction in California
for claims involving actions and
harm in Argentina, the Ninth Circuit
had upheld general jurisdiction over
Daimler based on the substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with
California by Daimler and its principal U.S. subsidiary, Mercedes Benz
USA. Mercedes was a Delaware corporation headquartered in New Jersey
which owned and operated numerous California facilities that sold
and serviced more than ten percent
of Daimler’s new cars nationwide.23
Justice Ginsburg for the Court again
held that general jurisdiction can be
exercised only when a corporation
is “essentially at home in the forum
state.”24 In so holding, she specifically
rejected the contention that a corporation’s engaging in a multi-billion
dollar “substantial, continuous and
systematic course of business” in a
state not its “home” can be sufficient
for general jurisdiction.25 She also
emphasized that a company cannot
fairly be treated as “at home” in every
jurisdiction in which it has substantial operations, as that would make
every large multi-national corporation subject to all-purpose jurisdiction
in every state.26
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Three years after Daimler, the Court
in BNSF27 again applied the new brightline dichotomy to reject jurisdiction
over Federal Employers’ Liability Act
claims brought in Montana state court.
In that case, the claims against the
defendant railroad company were for
injuries sustained outside Montana by
two nonresident employee plaintiffs.
In another opinion by Justice Ginsburg,
the Court held that the company’s
substantial contacts with the state —
consisting of 2,000 miles of track and
over 2,000 employees — were insufficient to satisfy due process. Neither
of the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims
arose from the company’s activities in
Montana so as to allow specific jurisdiction, the Court explained, and the
defendant company was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of
business in the state so as to be “at
home” for general jurisdiction.28

The “at home”
requirement was
groundbreaking
because many courts
had been finding
general jurisdiction
based on a company’s
continuous and
substantial “doing
business” in states
that were not the
corporation’s “home.”
Justice Ginsburg
herself later called
the decision
“pathmarking.”

Bristol-Myers: The “Arise out of or
Relate to” Requirement
In Bristol-Myers,29 the Supreme Court
held that California lacked jurisdiction
over 592 nonresident plaintiffs that had
been joined with 86 California resident
plaintiffs in eight coordinated “mass
actions” against Bristol-Myers Squibb
for injuries allegedly caused by the
company’s drug Plavix.30 Justice Samuel
Alito’s opinion followed the same
general-specific jurisdiction dichotomy set out in Goodyear, Daimler, and
BNSF. No one disputed that BristolMyers Squibb maintained extensive
and continuous multi-billion-dollar
operations in California, including five
research laboratory facilities employing approximately 160 employees and
250 sales representatives, as well as
a Sacramento advocacy office, substantial advertising, and hundreds of
millions of dollars in annual sales of
Plavix there. Nonetheless, the Court
held that the only two states where
general jurisdiction could be obtained
over the company would be its states
of incorporation (Delaware) and headquarters (New York).31
More fundamentally, the Court
held that the California courts lacked
“specific” jurisdiction over the 592
nonresident plaintiffs because none
of their claims bore any connection
to any Bristol-Myers Squibb activities in California.32 The Court reasoned
that under International Shoe, specific
jurisdiction requires that the plaintiff’s
suit must arise out of or relate to the
defendants’ contacts with the forum;
that is, there must be an “affiliation
between the forum and the underlying
controversy, principally, [an] activity
or an occurrence that takes place in
the forum State.” 33 It was undisputed
that the company did not manufacture, label, package, or manage the
marketing or obtaining of regula- u
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tory approval for Plavix in California.
Moreover, the nonresident plaintiffs
could not allege that they were injured
in California or that they purchased or
were prescribed their Plavix there.34
The quartet of decisions were
either unanimous (Goodyear, Daimler)
or nearly unanimous (8-1 in BNSF
and Bristol-Myers), demonstrating
strong agreement on the new brighter-line approach that cuts across
the Court’s other notable cleavages.
Nevertheless, Justice Sonia Sotomayor
authored strongly worded dissents in
Bristol-Myers and BNSF, as well as a
concurrence in Daimler, arguing that
the Court’s new, “more restrictive”
approach will make it “more difficult,”
and in some instances “impossible,” for
plaintiffs to bring nationwide aggregate actions addressing nationwide
corporate conduct, particularly in
cases involving small claims, foreign
country corporate defendants, or two
or more defendants that are “at home”
in different states.35

J. McIntyre: The “Fifty-State”
Targeting Dilemma
The Court’s contemporaneous decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro presented a significant issue:
What about a corporation that targets
the entire country with sales of a product that causes injury to a plaintiff in a
state in which the company otherwise
has no significant contacts?36 The case
divided the Court 4-2-3 in the same
term as the unanimous Goodyear decision. A New Jersey plaintiff had been
seriously injured by a metal shearing machine produced by defendant, J.
McIntyre. J. McIntyre was an English
company that sold its machines for
resale throughout the United States
to an independent Ohio distribution
company, which, in turn, structured
its advertising and sales efforts with
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J. McIntyre’s guidance. J. McIntyre
also attended annual industry conventions in various states (but never New
Jersey) to promote its machines alongside its U.S. distributor. It also obtained
U.S. patents for its machines.37 Yet
only a handful of machines ended
up in New Jersey. New Jersey’s highest court found personal jurisdiction
over J. McIntyre on the ground that it
placed its products into “the stream of
commerce” and “knew or should have
known that its products are distributed
through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products
being sold in any of the fifty states.”38
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s plurality opinion,
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts
and Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas, held that New Jersey
lacked specific jurisdiction because
there was no showing that the company “purposefully avail[ed] itself” of
the “benefits and protections” of New

As five of the
justices noted,
the “purposeful”
contacts requirement
should take on
new meaning in the
new global reality,
in which companies
may not intend for
their products to
reach any specific
state, but plainly
intend for them to
reach all states.

Jersey by “target[ing]” its sales there,
and that mere “foreseeability” that the
company’s products will be sold in the
state is insufficient. 39
Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by
Justice Samuel Alito, concurred in
the judgment because the company’s
contacts with New Jersey were too isolated. But Justice Breyer also noted that
the global digital market may soon call
upon the Court to recognize that the
idea of “targeting” of a forum state will
need to adapt to an age when foreign
producers can easily sell goods nationally and internationally through an
intermediary such as Amazon.com.40
Justice Ginsburg dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Elena Kagan and
Sotomayor, arguing that J. McIntyre’s
nationwide targeting in essence subsumed targeting New Jersey.41
The decision is a difficult pill to swallow. As five of the justices noted, the
“purposeful” contacts requirement
should take on new meaning in the
new global reality, in which companies may not intend for their products
to reach any specific state, but plainly
intend for them to reach all states. Yet
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion
points out that a blanket rule providing
jurisdiction over any company targeting all 50 states would result in a small
business in Appalachia being subject to
jurisdiction in Hawaii for selling goods
over the internet. Instead, he suggested an approach that also requires
that the forum be “fair” in light of the
defendant’s contacts with that forum.42

WALKING THE NEW BRIGHT
LINE: THE IMPACT ON
LITIGATION
The movement from the International
Shoe continuum to a brighter-line
dichotomy approach for general and
specific jurisdiction should not be

Judicature

inherently problematic. But the danger
is that this move will cause courts to
abandon the International Shoe admonition that “. . . the criteria by which
we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and
those which do not, cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative.”43 For this
reason, there should be flexibility in
and around the new bright lines.

Imagining “At Home” Test Flexibility
In the case of the “at home” requirement, the Supreme Court has already
made clear that there may be situations that will allow for general
jurisdiction beyond the paradigm scenarios.44 In Daimler, the Court pointed
to its 1952 decision in Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co. as an example of flexibility in its “essentially at
home” requirement. There, the Court
determined that because a Philippines
corporation’s president had temporarily moved management to Ohio during
World War II, general jurisdiction over
the company was satisfied.45
One can similarly imagine other scenarios in which a corporate defendant
might properly be found to be “essentially at home” for purposes of general
jurisdiction in states other than its
paradigm places of incorporation and
principal place of business: (1) a corporation has two (or three) headquarters
or principal locations;46 (2) a corporation’s executive headquarters is in a
different state than its principal operations center;47 (3) a conglomerate
corporation has separately managed
“divisions” headquartered in different
states, and the lawsuit involves one
such “division” in the forum state; or
(4) for large multinational corporations incorporated and headquartered
in other countries, “quasi-at home”
general jurisdiction might be found
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in the state of their U.S. headquarters
(e.g., the state of incorporation or the
headquarters of the company’s principal U.S. subsidiary) for injuries caused
to U.S. residents. Of course, in the last
two posited categories, it is possible
that plaintiffs may be able to obtain specific jurisdiction in the state if they can
show that the division headquarters or
U.S. headquarters at issue was responsible for managing the development,
design, production, marketing, testing,
or distribution of the complained-of
product, service, or communication.

Imagining “Arising out of or Relating
to” Test Flexibility
Correspondingly, for specific jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has not yet
defined the claim-connection phrase
“arise out of or relate to,” which originated in International Shoe.48 As a
matter of pure linguistic construction,
the phrase allows for two alternatives: “arising out of,” which is causal in
nature, or “relating to,” which denotes a
logical connection. Yet not just any logical connection should suffice: We know
that International Shoe and its progeny
require some purposeful conduct in or
towards the forum bringing about the
claim such that a reasonable defendant
would appreciate that its conduct could
subject it to jurisdiction in the forum.49
The sole jurisdictional due process
defect overturned in Bristol-Myers
was the inclusion in that case of 592
plaintiffs without any claim connection to the state whatsoever.50 But
the requirement for a claim connection should still allow for a range of
approaches to specific jurisdiction,
provided that the claims of all plaintiffs in the case are logically connected
to the defendant’s purposeful contacts
with the state.
For example, courts could, consistent with due process, apply a broader

“but for” claim-connection test, permitting jurisdiction in a state in which
the plaintiff’s alleged injuries would
not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s contacts with the state.51 In an
action alleging that significant caserelated clinical-trial testing used to
obtain regulatory approval for an
allegedly defective drug occurred in the
forum state, jurisdiction could arguably
be based on the claim connection that
the drug could not have been sold “but
for” such testing.52 Or plaintiffs who
purchased tickets sold and advertised in
their state for a tour or event in another
state at which they were injured could
sue the tour or event company in their
state based on the claim connection
that “but for” the defendant’s in-state
advertising and ticket sales, the injury
would not have occurred.53 In both
examples, the defendant company’s
due process “liberty interest” in being
required to respond to claims only in
fora in which it could reasonably expect
to be sued would be satisfied because
every plaintiff’s claim would be “but
for” connected to the company’s contacts with the forum state.54 The state
would also have an adequate “sovereign” interest to justify its exercise of
judicial power over a company with
such contacts.55 Moreover, there would
be no Bristol-Myers forum shopping
problem because all plaintiffs would be
linked by the “but for” claim connection
to the forum.
Some have criticized the “but for”
test as being too broad, since it could
arguably encompass every contact
identified along an incident’s causative
chain regardless of how substantially
related to the injury.56 Most courts
(at least before the Supreme Court’s
decision quartet) have applied either a
“proximate cause” or “substantial relation” test, both of which require a more
rigorous claim-connection with the u
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forum. Certainly, states are free to
apply these stricter tests.57 Yet many of
the courts that applied these stricter
tests for specific jurisdiction were also
utilizing the more jurisdiction-friendly
“doing business” tests for general
jurisdiction — essentially using general jurisdiction as a corrective “safety
valve” outlet to address poor outcomes
from overly strict specific jurisdiction tests.58 Now that the Supreme
Court has removed this “safety valve”
by substantially constraining general
jurisdiction, courts should be vigilant in
not blindly applying an overly restrictive claim-connection test that would
deprive deserving plaintiffs of access
to a reasonable forum.
Furthermore, in today’s era of the
internet and other similar mass marketing tools, the J. McIntyre 50-state
targeting dilemma should be solved
by treating any company’s regular and
systematic targeting of product sales
and marketing to all 50 states as “purposeful” targeting in any state in which
the plaintiff is injured. This treatment
should also be subject to a “reasonableness” analysis as to the fairness to the
defendant of the state exercising jurisdiction in the particular case.59
It should be stressed that each of
the Supreme Court’s quartet of cases
addressed problematic forum shopping; the plaintiffs had no strong
grounds to bring the dismissed claims
in the forum state. In Goodyear, plaintiffs brought suit in North Carolina
against foreign companies for an
accident that occurred in a foreign
country involving tires that were manufactured abroad.60 In Daimler, it was
Argentine plaintiffs suing a German
company in California for conduct that
occurred in Argentina.61 In BNSF, it was
nonresident plaintiffs bringing employment-related claims in Montana that
did not arise there and in which BNSF
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was not at home or even “quasi-at
home.”62 And, in Bristol-Myers, it was
hundreds of nonresident plaintiffs
whose claims were totally unconnected
with California.63 Read in this light, the
decision quartet provides greater simplicity and clarity of construct for due
process jurisdictional analysis, along
with a strong message against forum
shopping abuse. But the quartet decisions should still leave our courts with
the necessary flexibility to allow for
application of the “at home” and “arising out of or related to” requirements
in a manner that protects jurisdictional
access to our courts in accordance with
our “traditional conceptions of fair play
and substantial justice.”64

Class Actions Still Fit the New Shoe
In her Bristol-Myers dissent, Justice
Sotomayor asked whether nationwide
class actions may be at risk. Her concern was that corporate defendants
would now argue that specific jurisdiction in class actions would require
a claim-connection with the state for
each of the absent putative class members.65 The justice was right about the
challenges to come: Corporate defen-

dants have indeed taken this position
in a number of nationwide and multistate class actions since Bristol-Myers.
Yet, in the final analysis, there are a
number of reasons why the class action
vehicle should not be compromised by
the Court’s decision quartet.
First, in a nationwide or multistate
class action, a strong argument can
be made that only the named plaintiffs — not the absent class members
— should be considered as the plaintiffs
for purposes of determining the court’s
jurisdiction under Bristol-Myers. The
Supreme Court has already held that
absent class members may be deemed
parties only for some purposes, and not
for others.66 To determine traditional
diversity jurisdiction in a class action
under 28 USC § 1332(a), for example, it
is well settled that the Court will only
look to the citizenship of the named
plaintiffs, not to absent class members.67
There is logic to this distinction between
joined named plaintiffs and absent class
members: In a Bristol-Myers-type mass
action case, where there are hundreds
of nonresident plaintiffs joined in a
mass tort action, the defendant must
investigate, discover, and litigate each
plaintiff’s claim on issues like causation,
individual physician’s advice, potential misuse, and damages. In a certified
class action, by contrast, predominant
common legal and factual issues are, by
definition, mostly focused on the defendant and are presented by the named
representative plaintiffs with virtually
no participation by, or discovery from,
absent class members.
Several post-Bristol-Myers federal
district court decisions have confined
the specific jurisdiction analysis in
class actions to just the named plaintiffs on essentially these grounds.68
However, others courts have applied
Bristol-Myers to dismiss class action
claims brought on behalf of out-of-
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state absent class members, principally
on the grounds that the Rules Enabling
Act prohibits Federal Rule 23 from
being applied to abridge a defendant’s
substantive due process right not to
be subject to jurisdiction in a state for
any nonresident’s claims (even those
of absent class members) that have no
connection to the state.69
The Supreme Court’s groundbreaking 1985 class action decision in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts (authored by
Justice William Rehnquist)70 was the
first to uphold the very concept of
a state court adjudicating a nationwide class action. Shutts also provides
support for analyzing jurisdiction
in class actions by reference only to
the named plaintiffs, even though
the Supreme Court’s Bristol-Myers
decision declined to find the case
persuasive with respect to the BristolMyers plaintiffs in that mass action
(not class action) case.71
Shutts influences how class actions
are litigated to this day, holding for the
first time that a state court can adjudicate a nationwide class action without
first obtaining jurisdiction over the
absent plaintiff class members. The
Court reasoned that due process did
not require the same “minimum contacts” protections for absent class
members as for a defendant, noting
that absent class members are not burdened in the litigation in the same way
as a defendant: they are not haled into
court; they do not need to fear damages or penalty; and they are, at least in
money-damages actions, given notice
and the right to opt out, along with the
safeguard of a court approval requirement and an opportunity to be heard
for any proposed class settlement.
Moreover, absent class members
are protected by the representative
nature of the class action through the
class certification process.72

71

Thus, Shutts can be read to support
the proposition that, generally, only the
named plaintiffs’ claims should be considered in the jurisdictional analysis
because absent plaintiff class members
are not parties to the same degree, do
not present defendants with the same
burdens, and are being represented by
the named plaintiffs through a rigorous class certification procedure.
It is proposed that, in class actions,
courts should adopt a presumption in favor of specific jurisdiction
based solely on the named plaintiffs’
claim-connections to the forum state,
but the presumption should be subject
to a defendant’s demonstration that
the state has an insufficient connection to absent class members to satisfy
the “reasonableness” requirement for
the exercise of specific jurisdiction.
After all, plaintiffs’ class counsel

It is proposed that, in
class actions, courts
should adopt a
presumption in favor
of specific jurisdiction
based solely on the
named plaintiffs’ claimconnections to the
forum state, but the
presumption should be
subject to a defendant’s
demonstration that the
state has an insufficient
connection to absent
class members to satisfy
the “reasonableness”
requirement.

should not, as a matter of “fair play and
substantial justice,” be able to choose
a state as the forum for a nationwide
class action based on only a few in-state
named plaintiffs and little else to tie
the defendant to the forum. Of course,
in a nationwide class action, any one
state generally will not have a huge
percentage of class members as compared to the entire remainder of the
country, but what could be shown to
be unreasonable is for the state to have
an insignificant number of class members beyond the named plaintiffs. Due
process requires that the defendant’s
contacts “reasonably” support the exercise of jurisdiction, taking into account
the burdens on the defendant.73
More fundamentally, regardless of
how the present litigation over how
to apply Bristol-Myers to absent class
members is resolved, there should
be little reason for concern over the
continued viability of class actions
alleging nationwide corporate misconduct. Plaintiffs’ class counsel can use at
least three approaches in future cases
to support personal jurisdiction over a
nationwide plaintiff class action under
even the least jurisdiction-friendly
reading of Bristol-Myers:
1. Class plaintiffs can obtain specific
jurisdiction for a nationwide class
in a state in which the defendant
company has developed, designed,
produced, tested, or from which
it has distributed the offending
product, packaging or communication. For a consumer contract
case, the forum could be the corporation’s place of contracting.74
2. Class plaintiffs can also obtain general jurisdiction in the defendant’s
“at home” state of incorporation
or principal place of business. If
there is more than one defendant,
the issue can become more complicated, but there should often u
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be overlap in at least one state
among the potential specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction
states that would encompass all
defendants. Moreover, for multiple corporate defendants who
have allegedly engaged in wrongdoing together, jurisdiction could
potentially also lie in the states
where they engaged together in
the alleged wrongdoing.
3. For federal securities,75 antitrust,76
ERISA,77 and certain other federal
claims,78 there is nationwide personal jurisdiction available in the
federal district courts via nationwide service of process statutes,
and, therefore, nationwide class
actions are potentially available
for these significant claim areas.
The federal district court will also
have supplemental subject matter
jurisdiction over state law claims
joined in the action.79 Indeed, one
unintended result of the decision
quartet may be to encourage plaintiffs’ counsel to search for such
federal claims to provide nationwide jurisdiction.
Thus, if plaintiffs’ class counsel are
mindful in their forum selection process, the issue of nonresident absent
class members should not present
significant jurisdictional issues going
forward.
Indeed, there are other protections
to prevent plaintiffs’ class counsel from
pursuing nationwide class actions in a
forum state in which absent class members’ claims bear no real connection
to the state. Shutts itself had a second
holding in addition to its upholding
a state court’s power to adjudicate a
nationwide class action. That second
holding makes clear, as later reinforced
by subsequent circuit decisions, that
due process prevents application of the
forum state’s law to a multistate class
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action for nonresident class members
whose claims are not connected to the
state.80 Plaintiffs’ counsel who attempt
to squeeze too many different applicable state laws into one nationwide or
multistate class action risk losing the
all-important class certification motion
for lack of predominance of common
issues.81 If the courts and the Supreme
Court do adopt the proposed personal
jurisdiction analysis for class actions
that presumptively looks only to the
plaintiff class representatives for specific jurisdiction, this should further
underscore the important gate-keeping function of the class certification
motion.

Shoe Repair: Statutory or
Federal Rule Fixes for the
Decision Quartet and J. McIntyre?
It bears noting that the recent Supreme
Court decision quartet and J. McIntyre
have propelled a number of proposals from the academy to provide for
nationwide federal court personal
jurisdiction for diversity of citizenship
or alienage (foreign defendant citizenship) cases. One proposal calls for
the change to be made in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).82 Other proposals call for congressional statutory
authorization of nationwide federal
district court jurisdiction in such cases,
together with new venue provisions
to fairly locate actions among the district courts. These statutory proposals
stem largely from the concern that
a simple Rule amendment impacting personal jurisdiction could violate
the 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) Rules Enabling
Act’s proscription against Rules that
would modify or abridge a substantive
right.83 The governing assumption of
all of these proposals is that the Fifth
Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth
Amendment governing the states,
would allow for nationwide personal

jurisdiction over all such claims.84 The
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of
Procedure, at its April 10, 2018, meeting, discussed the issue but opted to
defer active work on such changes for
future consideration.85

CONCLUSION:
A PREMIUM ON EARLY STEPS
Following the decision quartet and
J. McIntyre, there is a premium on
plaintiffs’ counsel getting personal
jurisdiction right at the outset. These
decisions also should propel thoughtful counsel on both sides to try to
reach agreements that avoid unnecessary jurisdictional disputes. As a
former longtime large-case litigator,
I teach my Complex Civil Litigation
students that it is often in both sides’
interests from a cost-effectiveness
standpoint to try to reach early agreement on personal jurisdiction issues
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— such as agreeing on just one corporate defendant in a corporate family
that is clearly subject to jurisdiction,
and dismissing unnecessary affiliates
or parent companies. Counsel for both
sides should also discuss agreements
that would allow plaintiffs to refile in
a more appropriate jurisdiction, for 28
U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406(a) transfers
to an appropriate district, for § 1407
centralization, or simply for one appropriate federal or state jurisdiction for
all plaintiffs. It may not be possible to
reach agreement in every case, but it
will certainly be worth the effort.
Moreover, a nationwide class action
or mass action will not necessarily be
the most just, speedy, efficient, and
cost-effective format for the resolution of every case concerning even
nationwide-impacting corporate conduct. There are important values
and choice-of-law benefits in local
resolution of local citizens’ claims
(and local defenses related to such
claims). Sometimes the better choice
in aggregate litigation may consist
of statewide-only actions brought
only on behalf of state residents.
1
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U.S.C. § 1407, together with state-federal court coordination. This approach
can allow parties to benefit from both
nationwide pretrial coordination and
localized trials.
Courts now have at least two decades
of experience with ad hoc coordination of similar cases that remain in
both state and federal courts. State and
federal judges often agree to coordinate discovery and motion schedules,
hear nearly identical motions in each
other’s courtrooms together, and
work to organize bellwether trials
and other efforts toward settlement.
In fact, the website for the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has
a link dedicated to “Federal and State
Coordination,” which is described as
“[a] joint project by the National Center
for State Courts and the Federal Judicial
Center.” There are numerous examples
of successfully coordinated cases.86
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